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COMPARATIVE LAW, UNIFICATION AND SCHOLARLY CREATION
OF A NEW IUS COMMUNEt
I
A major theme of legal scholarship has been the unification of law.
With the rise of the modern nation state this theme tended to concern
unification of law within one nation. As a reaction to the rise of the nation
state and the aggressive tendencies of such nation states, towards the end
of the nineteenth century, international unification of law became a
popular preoccupation. In this century, the experience of two world wars
has indicated the difficulties of such unification, given the basic political
instability of the nation state system,I while, for some writers, increasing
the desirability of unification.
The founding fathers of modern comparative law took unification of
law around the world as a basic aim of comparative law. Adopting a
nineteenth-century epistemology of science and social science, they
argued that analysis of the varying national laws would help demonstrate
or indicate a universal common law of all mankind, thus permitting the
elimination of national contingencies and the propounding of a "droit
ideal relatif".2 The founding fathers regarded unification of law as the
task of comparative law-
Le droit compare est la branche speciale de la science juridique qui a pour objet le
rapprochement systematique des pays civilis~s. 3
This consensus as to the nature and purpose of comparative law has been
lost, and the past eighty years have seen endless debate over the nature
and purpose of comparative law, 4 over the name "comparative law"
itself, 5 and over whether comparative law is a "science" or a
"method". 6
t An essay-review.
1 On this see, e.g., Poggi, The Development of the Modern State (1978), 86-116, and
especially pp. 90-92, where he discusses the instability of the system of states.
2 I am thinking here of the views propounded at the 1900 World Congress of Compara-
tive Law by, most notably, Saleilles and Lambert, on which see, e.g., Gutteridge,
Comparative Law. An Introduction to the Comparative Method of Legal Study and
Research (1971, reprint of 1949 Cambridge edition), 18-19. These thinkers were very
much under the influence of nineteenth-century sociology (especially that of Comte)
and of biology. Saleilles once stated that: "L'unification progressive est la loidetoutcequi
bvolue, et le droit est - voie constante d'bvolution .... "See "La fonction juridique du droit
compare," Rechstwissenschaftliche Beitrage (Juristische festgabe des Auslandes zu Josef
Kohlers 60 Geburtstag 9 Marz 1909) (1909), 164-175, at p. 167. See further, Schmit-
thoff, "The Science of Comparative Law" (1939) 7 C.L.J. 94, 107-109.
3 L~vy-Ullman, found quoted in Lee, "Comparative Law and Comparative Lawyers"
[1936] J.S.P.T.L. 1, 3.
4 See, e.g., Gutteridge, op. cit., ch. 1, and Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to
Comparative Law (1974), ch. 1.
5 Should the common English term or the French droit compar or the Spanish derecho
comparado be replaced by a term analogous to the German Rechtsvergleichung? See
Watson, op. cit., p. 1 and his note 2 thereon.
6 See, e.g., Schmitthoff, op. cit.; Watson, op. cit., pp. 1-2. Watson points out that this
debate has often turned into a debate about language. For an elegant argument in
favour of comparative law being a science, see Constantinesco, L.J., Traiti de Droit
Compari, Vol. I, Book III (1972) ch. 2 (translation from the German).
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Rend David, as is fitting for one who once worked for Unidroit, has
devoted much attention to unification of laws. 7 David, in his many
writings, does not explicitly consider the nature of comparative law as
such: in fact, he does not believe that comparative law as an autonomous
discipline exists; only the comparative method, which he considers to
have varying uses, one of them being international unification of law. 8 As
Watson has rightly pointed out, David does not explain what the compa-
rative method is: he assumes it is obvious.9
For much of this century, it has been thought that the way to effect
international unification of law is through the activities of various
bodies which transcend national legal systems. International conven-
tions, adopted and ratified by member states, were intended to result in
unification. The legislative activities of the various organs of the Euro-
pean Economic Community are intended to have a unifying effect on the
laws of member states. 10 In an essay entitled "The Methods of Unifica-
tion", Rend David considered the use of international conventions (and
the like) in the unification of law, and concluded that insufficient prog-
ress had been made. I He argued for other methods to be used to unify
law. He propounds essentially the same view in his chapter entitled "The
International Unification of Private Law" in the second volume of the
International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law. 12
David argues that, in general, the search for unification by means of
international conventions has failed, and he explains this failure in terms
of ideas of national sovereignty. 13 He argues, however, that if unification
is placed on a "simple doctrinal level" and limited to "defining the
meaning of certain words, classifying legal rules, and fitting them into a
uniform plan", then progress may be made towards unification by the
work of legal scholars and of courts. ' 4 David is in favour of a new ius
commune, analogous to that of continental Europe before the nineteenth
century. He states that a new ius commune could be created by means of
conventions and model laws, though, of course, he doubts their efficacy
7 See the Trait ,lkmentaire de Droit Civil Compar (1950), 141-185; "The Methods
of Unification" (1968) 16 Am. Jo. Comp. Law 13;"Pour une conception plus souple de
l'unification internationale du droit" (1969) 12 Revue Romaine des Sciences Sociales,
SciencesJuridiques 51; "The International Unification of Private Law", ch. 5 in Mohr,
International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, Vol. 2 (1971); "Unification du Droit et
Arbitrage" (1977) (G. Ph. Verhagen Lecture, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam); and
"Le Droit Continental, la 'Common Law' et les Perspectives d'un 'Jus commune'Europken"
in New Perspectives for a Common Law of Europe (ed. Cappelletti 1978), 113.
8 Trait Etkmentaire, 4, and 141-185.
9 Watson, op. cit., pp. 1-2 and note 4 thereon.
10 See, e.g., Kahn-Freund, "On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law" in Selected
Writings (1978), 294, 295-297.
11 "The Methods of Unification" (1968) 16 Am. Jo. Comp. Law 13, hereafter cited as
"Methods".
12 "The International Unification of Private Law", loc. cit.
13 "Methods", p. 16 and pp. 19-22, and "International Unification of Private Law", e.g.,
pp. 141-150.
14 "Methods", p. 17.
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in political terms. 15 He argues that the creation of this ius commune is the
task of legal scholars. He states that legal theory created national law and
that it is for legal theory to create a modern ius commune in the face of
political indifference-
In the absence of specific legislative commands, judges and lawyers in the different
countries must search together, as was done in the universities with respect to the ius
commune, for solutions which appear best to serve the ends of justice and the
development of international commerce.16
He concludes that-
Lawyers must be awakened to the conscience of the new world and must be instilled
with an international spirit which has lain dormant during a century of retreat into
national law. In this lies the task of comparative law. 17
David is arguing that the task of comparative law is in fact that set out by
the World Congress of 1900.18
The programme David sets out is clear. Scholars must carry out
research into the varying systems of national law to identify the areas in
which they differ and the areas in which they correspond. By mapping
out the areas of difference and those of correspondence, it should be
possible to identify some common core of all the legal systems which
could function as a ius commune created by scholars and judges which
would serve to give a unity-if a limited one-to law around the globe. It
should be noted that implicit in this is the assumption that there are
certain fundamental concepts underlying all the systems of law of the
world.
II
In a recent book based on his Tagore Law Lectures, Professor
David has taken the opportunity to put his views on the role of jurists into
practical effect. His book is entitled English Law and French Law: A
Comparison in Substance. 19 David states that his purpose is-
. . . to consider a variety of branches of the law and to investigate in such branches
what is, in England and in France, the present state of the law and which differences
are to be noted there between the two systems; and it is also to consider what is the
prospect of seeing the oppositions of older times be attenuated or disappear in a world
where international relations call for more uniformity than ever. 2°
Considering the general plan for comparative law which David has
15 "Methods", pp. 21-22. As regards model laws, it is worth remembering that similar
words may be interpreted differently by different national courts and thus be applied
differently. See Merryman, "On the Convergence (and Divergence) of the Civil Law
and the Common Law" in New Perspectives for a Common Law of Europe (ed.
Cappelletti 1978), 195-233, at pp. 205-207.
16 "Methods", p. 26.
17 "Methods", p. 27.
18 See fn. 2 ante.
19 (1980).
20 English Law and French Law, Introduction, p. 10.
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elaborated over the last few years, it is instructive to examine this book
for the light it sheds on David's contention that comparatists ought to be
utilising the "comparative method" to create a new ius commune.
Comparative study of foreign legal systems is known to be fraught
with problems: problems of terminology, of comparability, of
superficiality. 21 In an attempt to avoid many of these problems, it has
become common to adopt a functionalist approach and to try to deter-
mine how various legal systems deal with similar social circumstances or
problems. Such a functionalist approach tends to emphasise law in
action: law as a process rather than as an abstract conceptual system.
Even so, it is still generally necessary to describe the structure of the
particular legal system and to explain its functioning so as to render
comprehensible any account of any particular branch of the law. Profes-
sor David, despite the subtitle of his book, devotes-and rightly so-a
great deal of attention to delineating and analysing the legal systems of
France and England. This is necessary to provide a foundation for the
rest of his study. It is proposed here to examine certain aspects of David's
discussion of the two legal systems, firstly to demonstrate the general
inadequacy of his treatment and, secondly, to assess whether his failure
has any implications on a theoretical level for his overall plan of creating a
ius commune.
David's primary thesis is that English law is a law of remedies while
French law is a law of rights. He explains this difference on the basis of
historical development and the ground covered is what one would
expect. 22 More controversially, David claims that continental lawyers
are "deeply shocked" by the English dichotomy-his term-between
"law" and "equity": he states that for continental lawyers a notion of
equity or justice is implicit in law.2 3 In fact, David here comes close to
arguing that continental lawyers are still devotees of the natural law
school of legal philosophy. 24 It is true that, from 1900 onwards, French
lawyers have freed themselves from the dogmatism of the exegetical
school, largely under the influence of the proponents of the libre r&cherche
method, notably G~ny; but it is doubtful if French lawyers should be
described as being any less devoted to legal positivism than are those of
England. 25
Professor David's description of equity as being designed to temper
the rigours of the common law is a reasonably accurate description of
equity's historical origin, but it is very doubtful if one should still
attribute this function to equity, even though the distinction still has
21 See, e.g., Watson, Legal Transplants (1974), 10-15; Kahn-Freund, "Comparative
Law as an Academic Subject" in Selected Writings (1978), 275, at 285-290; and F. H.
Lawson, "The Field of Comparative Law" in Selected Essays, vol. 2, p. 2.
22 The different methods of legal education in the two countries, the forms of action in
England and the like; see English Law and French Law, 1-15.
23 Ibid., p. 7.
24 Ibid., pp. 6, 7, 10, 11 and 13.
25 See G6ny, Mithode d'Interpritation et Sources en Droit Privi Positif(2nd ed. trans. by
Mayda, 1963).
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practical consequences. 26 In the eighteenth century, the Scottish jurist
and philosopher, Lord Kames, in his Principles of Equity, made the same
mistake as David, stating that English equity was intended to abate the
rigours of the common law. 27 Blackstone was quick to correct Kames,
and provided a lengthy refutation of Kames's view. Blackstone thus
justified his long refutation of Kames-
I have been tempted to go so far, because the very learned author to whom I have
alluded, and whose works have given exquisite pleasure to every contemplative
lawyer, is (among many others) a strong proof how easily names, and loose or un-
guarded expressions to be met with in the best of our writers, are apt to confound a
stranger; and to give him erroneous ideas of separate jurisdictions now existing in
England, which never were separated in any other country in the universe.
28
Blackstone stated that, in his day, the difference between the equity and
common law jurisdictions lay-
... in the different modes of administring justice in each; in the mode of proof, the
mode of trial, and the mode of relief.29
Blackstone's criticism of Kames could be applied to David with even
more force, given the fusion of equity and common law procedure in the
late nineteenth century. Baker points out that nowadays the Chancery
jurisdiction requires very certain rules because of the nature of the work
therein; and, while equity has become law and moved away from broad
notions of justice, the common law has become more influenced by such
broad notions of justice. 30 He refers to Lord Denning, the Master of the
Rolls, who, in a recent case, said: "It is common lawyers who now do
equity!" 3'
Professor David pays considerable attention to the codified form of
much of French law, and much of what he says is illuminating and of
profit to the reader. 32 He stresses the recent nature of much of codifica-
tion on the Continent and argues that the differences in methods of legal
reasoning between French and English lawyers arise, not so much from
the existence of codes, but rather from different traditional attitudes to
statute law and case law. He argues that French law and English law have
different conceptions of a legal rule: in French law a legal rule is-he
argues-viewed as existing outwith the legal system, being formulated
by scholars and legislators, whereas in English law a legal rule has
26 On the history of equity and common law, see Baker, An Introduction to English Legal
History (2nd ed. 1979), 83-99.
27 Henry Home, Lord Kames, Principles of Equity (I st ed. 1760). Kames was a judge and
a leading member of the Scottish Aufkiarung.
28 Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 3 (1st ed. 1768), 441. The refutation covers
pp. 430-441. I used the University of Chicago facsimile of the 1st edition in four
volumes of 1765-1769.
29 Ibid., p. 436. Blackstone was well aware of the historical development of the equityjurisdiction of the Chancery, but was concerned to give the modern view: see ibid., pp.
431-436. He was also concerned to refute older English authors.
30 Baker, op. cit., p. 99.
31 Hill v. C. A. Parsons and Co. Ltd. [1971] 3 All E.R. 1345, 1359.
32 English Law and French Law, 16-26.
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traditionally been viewed rather more narrowly as deriving from particu-
lar cases. 33
The relative importance of case law in France and England is a
contentious subject, and David merely gives his own view. His view of
the difference between England and France in this respect does seem
overly-based on a rather static view of the two legal systems, in so far as he
stresses the theoretical differences between jurisprudence constante and
binding precedent, rather than considering practice in both countries.
Thus, in the Encyclop~die Dalloz, it is stated that-
On peut dire sans paradoxe que la cour de cassation a plus de respect pour les arrts de ses
chambres runies que pour la loi elle-mime, car s'il lui arrive d'altkrer ou de modifier la lot
sous couleur de l'interpr~ter, elle n'abandonne jamais la jurisprudence cr&be par un arret des
chambres rhunies.
34
The nature of the doctrine of precedent in English law is problematic;
and it would be inappropriate to deal with all the difficulties here, but the
following words of the late Sir Rupert Cross are accurate and worth
bearing in mind in this respect-
English case law is not the same as la jurisprudence, but it is a mistake to suppose that
our judges permanently inhabit a wilderness of single instances. 35
Professor David supposes that they do.
David states that in civil law countries codification "is regarded as
inaugurating a new start in the development of the law". 36 In many ways
this is, in strict theory, correct for France, though it may be pointed out
that the loi of 30 ventose, an XII seems to have omitted to abolish the
droit intermbdiare, which presumably could have been applied, in theory,
if not in practice, in areas not covered by the Code civil of 1804. Two
points arise from this-
1. Does codification necessarily entail a "new start"?
2. Does codification historically produce a "new start"?
33 Ibid., pp. 19-26. David makes the same point,though argued more fully, in his earlier
French Law: its Structure Sources and Methodology (trans. Kindred 1972), 76-83.
David's point about the historically different attitudes of Continental and English
lawyers to case-law is, at the least, arguable. See Gorla, "La 'Communis Opinio Totius
Orbis' et la Reception Jurisprudentielle du Droit au cours de XVIe, XVIIe et XVIIIe
Sicles dans la 'CivilLaw' et la 'Common Law"' 'in New Perspectives for a Common Law
of Europe (ed. Cappelletti 1978), 45-71. Modem historical research is tending to
show that differences between the common law and civil law methodologies prior to
codification have been exaggerated, because of over-emphasis on civilian doctrinal
writings.
34 Encyclopidie Dalloz, v. iii, p. 22, para. 26, found quoted in Cross, Precedent in English
Law (3rd ed. 1977), 15-16, note 2.
35 Cross, op. cit., p. 16. Sir Rupert Cross develops this in his text at pp. 16-17, where he
explains the practical effect of the theoretical difference. He points out that English
appellate courts often lay down rules on quantum of damages to be followed by lower
courts, which would be unthinkable in France. See pp. 12-17 generally for an
excellent brief account of differences between the French and English doctrine of
precedent.
36 English Law and French Law, 22.
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The French code of 1804 became, and remains, the archetype of
nineteenth-century civil law codification, and the attention understand-
ably focused on it has perhaps detracted from the study of other
nineteenth-century codes. The most obvious example of a code which
did not abrogate all prior law is the Civil Code of Lower Canada of 1866:
this code would appear to be an authentic code in the Napoleonic
tradition, though it leaves open the possibility of appeal to pre-Code
law. 37 That this is so has led one French-Canadian lawyer to remark
that-
it n'y a pas, a proprement parler de droit ancien ni de droit nouveau en cette
province.
3 8
Article 2613 of this Code states thus-
The Laws in force at the time of the coming into force of this code are abrogated in all
cases:
In which there is a provision herein having expressly or impliedly that effect;
In which such laws are contrary to or inconsistent with any provision herein con-
tained;
In which express provision is herein made upon the particular matter to which such
laws relate. ... 39
Article 2615 is as follows-
If in any article of this code founded on the laws existing at the time of its promulga-
tion, there be a difference between the English and French texts, that version shall
prevail which is most consistent with the provisions of the existing laws on which the
article is founded. .... 40
This demonstrates that there is nothing inherent in the nature of a civil
code which requires it necessarily to constitute a "fresh start". It is impor-
tant to stress this, because Professor David's words could be interpreted
so as to suggest he would answer in the affirmative the first question set
out above. 41 Some writers have seriously suggested that, for a civil code
to be a "true code", whatever this means, it necessarily has to bring about
a complete rupture with the past. Brierley, in his study of the Quebec
Code of 1866, because of the Code's not making a break with the past, felt
the necessity of arguing that the Code was in fact an authentic civilian
code and not a mere consolidation of the laws. 42 In the continuing
controversy over the early legal history of Louisiana, it has often been
alleged that the fact that the promulgation of the Digest of the Civil Laws
37 See Brierley, "Quebec's Civil Law Codification" (1968) 14 McGill L.J. 521, at pp.
554-565.
38 Mignault, Le Droit Civil Canadien (1895), vol. i, 52.
39 The last paragraph of article 2613, omitted here, contains a transitional provision.
40 The last paragraph of article 2615, omitted here, refers to articles which change the
law.
41 I.e. "Does codification necessarily entail a 'new start'?"
42 Brierley, op. cit., 554-565. He concludes that "Codification . . . is not in its essence a
technique for bringing about a revolution in the content of the law."
[Vol. 32, No. 3
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of the Territory of Orleans of 1808 does not seem to have resulted in the
abrogation of all prior law means that of necessity the Digest is not a "true
code". 43 Thus, though I would not suggest that Professor David himself
considers codification as necessarily constituting a "new start", it is
worth belabouring the point that the first question set out above should
be answered in the negative because of the uncertainty that exists on this
matter.
To turn now to the second question, it would seem that few codes
historically have constituted a complete break with the past. Codes may
explicitly preserve the prior law as did the Civil Code of Lower Canada of
1866. Codes will generally be constructed, at least in part, out of existing
legal materials: this is so for the Code civil des franqais.44 Continuity of
legal tradition is also important, and practice in this respect may con-
found theory. In this respect, it is useful to look at French legal history
after the promulgation of the Code civil.
The French exegetical school considered that their exposition of the
law should be guided by the articles of the Code alone. One is reminded
of Beugnet's famous aphorism-
Messieurs, je n'enseigne pas le droit civil; je ne connais que le code Napoleon.45
The theory may have been that simple exegesis of the Code sufficed to
solve any problem; the practice seems to have been different. It is
instructive here to consider some of the early commentaries on the Code
civil. The articles of the Code civil of 1804 are terse-indeed epigramma-
tic-in style. As Daube points out, simplicity and brevity do not neces-
sarily coincide with intelligibility and accuracy. 46 If one examines one of
the first commentaries on the new code, Maleville's Analyse Raisonn de
la discussion du Code Civil au Conseil d'Etat,47 one discovers that Male-
ville's discussion of the articles is shot through with ideas drawn from the
ancien droit. In fact, all early commentators view the Code civil through a
filter provided by the ancien droit. It is useful to examine one specific
example. DeLaporte and Riffd-Caubray commented on the Code civil in
a multi-volume work entitled Les Pandectes Franqaises. Article 146 of the
Code states that consent is a requisite for marriage. Article 148 states that
lack of consent or error as to person are grounds for annulling a marriage.
In their commentary on article 146, DeLaporte and Riff6-Caubray ex-
43 Consider the following remark by Dargo in his Jefferson's Louisiana: Politics and the
Clash of Legal Traditions (1975), 157: "A code . . . replaces prior law and itself
becomes the definitive and final statement of the law for purposes of adjudication.
Despite some formal resemblances to a modern civil code, therefore, the Digest of 1808
lacked the essential element of a genuine work of code law ....
44 See Esmein, "L'Originalitg du Code civil," in Le Code Civil, 1804-1904 Livre du
Centenaire (1969) (reprint of 1904 Paris edition), vol. i, 5-21.
45 Found quoted in, e.g., David and Brierley, Major Legal Systems in the World Today
(2nd ed. 1978), 3, and note 3 thereon.
46 Daube, "The influence of Interpretation on Writing" (1970) 20 Buffalo L. Rev. 41,
43-46.
47 Jacques de Maleville (1st ed. 1805; 2nd ed. 1807). Maleville's work places the codal
articles in context.
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plain how violence, seduction and error vitiate consent: in this they
follow the ancien droit, the Code civil not mentioning such details.
48
It is only natural that early commentators should so have acted: they
had to make sense of the lapidary texts of the Code civil, and the ancien
droit, in which they had been trained, provided them with aids to
interpretation. Indeed, it would not be an exaggeration to state that the
Code civil in many respects presupposed a knowledge of the ancien droit.
In 1826 Fenet published an edition of the Code civil with, after each
article, summaries of, and references to, relevant passages of Pothier.
49
Similarly, the pre-Revolutionary collection of jurisprudence by Guyot
went through several editions, by Merlin, after the promulgation of the
1804 Code, with the addition of new passages in the text to take account of
the Code and subsequent developments. 50 In the middle of the
nineteenth century it was still thought useful to bring out editions of
Pothier with references to relevant articles of the Code civil in footnotes. 51
Clearly there is considerably more continuity than Professor David
admits. By emphasising the theory behind codification as developed by
commentators of the exegetical school in France, Professor David has
ignored the fact that the practice was rather different.
III
Considerable attention has been devoted to Professor David's recent
book in order to highlight the problems with his programme for
the creation of a new ius commune by comparative legal scholars. To
compare the legal systems of England and France, David has had to
construct two simplified models: this is necessary to avoid too great a
degree of detail which can render comparison impossible. Rather than
being models simplified to facilitate comparison, Professor David's out-
lines of the two legal systems tend towards being caricatures. There are
two aspects to this.
First, Professor David relies on an overly-simplified and static
model of the law. He relies excessively on the "official" theory of how the
legal systems of France and England work. He uses no insights from the
work of sociologists of law, or indeed of the Scandinavian or American
48 DeLaporte and Riff6-Caubray, Les Pandectes Franaises (18 vols. 1803-1817), vol. iii,
141-154.
49 Fenet, Pothier Analysi dans ses Rapports avec le Code Civil, et Mis en Ordre sous Chacun
des Articles de ce Code (1st ed. 1826; 2nd ed. 1829). It was Fenet who collected together
all the preparatory works involved in the compilation of the Code.
50 Guyot, Ripertoire Universel et Raisonn deJurisprudence etc. (1st ed. 1775-1783; 2nd
ed. 1784-1785; 3rd ed. by Comte Merlin, 1807-1808; 4th ed. 1812-1815; 5th ed.
1827-1828). The 3rd to the 5th editions are normally described as Merlin's Ropertoire
etc.
51 I am thinking here of the Bugnet editions of 1845-1848 and 1861-1862, entitled
Oeuvres de Pothier, annotes et mises en corrglation avec le Code civil et la legislation
actuelle. There were numerous ordinary editions of Pothier during the nineteenth
century.
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legal realists, to shed light on the actual operation of either the French or
English legal systems. At the level of doctrine, he stresses official theory
to the detriment of practice: he, accepts without question that the Code
civil of 1804 constituted the rupture with the past that the exegetical
school of jurists claimed it did. Further, he seems to misunderstand
English equity. Though David's mistake may be understandable, he
would have done well to ponder on Francis Bacon's words on unification
of Scots and English law at the start of the seventeenth century, when
Bacon considered that it would be best for Scots lawyers and English
lawyers to expound their own systems for purposes of comparison to
make obvious correspondence and differences, because otherwise Eng-
lish lawyers and Scots lawyers could easily misunderstand each other's
legal system. 52
Second, Professor David is largely expounding his own views on the
French legal system. For example, when he argues that continental
scholars utilise a mode of reasoning deriving from notions of natural law,
and are concerned with ideas of justice in contrast to common lawyers'
obsession with due process, he does acknowledge (in a footnote) that-
There are many schools of thought on the European Continent and the views
expressed in this chapter will not be unanimously approved.
53
This highlights a basic problem with David's study of English and
French law, and with his more general programme for comparative law:
the vast divergence of doctrinal views.
IV
These particular points arising out of Professor David's recent book
raise important considerations in relation to his general programme for
legal unification. David has called for the creation of a new ius commune
by scholars of comparative law: a ius commune analogous to that of
Europe before the nineteenth century. 54 But if there is a major diversity
of views as to the nature of one legal system, what possibility is there of a
scholarly consensus sufficient to create a new ius commune?
The period before the rise of the national legal systems in the
52 "Certain Articles or Considerations touching the Union of the Kingdoms of England
and Scotland: collected and dispersed for his Majesty's better service" in The Works of
Lord Bacon (Bohn edition 1846), vol. i, 453, 457-458; and "A Preparation toward the
Union of the Laws of England and Scotland", ibid., pp. 641--647, at p. 642. See
generally on this proposed union, Levack, "The Proposed Union of English Law and
Scots Law in the Seventeenth Century" (1975) Juridical Review 97.
53 English Law and French Law, 7, note 4.
54 A point not of direct relevance, but worth mentioning nonetheless, is that Professor
David's apparent assumption that the ius commune lasted until codification is, to say
the least, highly arguable. It seems much more useful to accept the view that in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries all over Europe national civil law systems were
developing out of, and away from, the ius commune. See Coing, "The Institutes of
National Law in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries" (1972)Juridical Review
193.
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eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was at least a period of general
consensus as to the nature of law in continental Europe. There may have
been differences between scholars over the mos Italicus or mos Gallicus;
there may have been development from a deist to a secular natural law;
but there was general consensus as to the nature and function of law, no
doubt due to the common Roman law heritage of continental Europe, as
guarded in the universities. David is correct in so far as he sees the Code
civil of 1804 as signifying an important change. In many ways the Code
was the product of eighteenth-century natural law while paradoxically it
marked the shift to legal positivism:5 5 the legal positivism which David
identifies with the development of national laws.5 6 But, even so, the
nineteenth century was still a period of general ideological consensus
among legal scholars: the dispute provoked by Savigny over the desira-
bility of codification was not, in essence, about the nature and function of
law but rather about the historical relationship between law and a par-
ticular people.5 7 Further, despite the romantic nationalism of the
nineteenth century, it was a century when many countries adopted and
borrowed the laws of other countries; indeed, Zajtay points out that, to a
very considerable extent, the French code played the part of a ius
commune for the Latin peoples in the nineteenth century. 58
In this century, however, the scholarly consensus, as to the nature
and function of law, has disappeared. Alongside the growth of the
modern state has come a vast burgeoning of legislation on all matters.
Law has taken on a more instrumental function and is viewed as providing
a method of managing the economy, of relieving poverty, of allocating
resources. This new role for law has increased ideological confusion.
There is a plethora of approaches ranging from those of Marxists to those
of Hayek or Friedman. David assumes that unification is a technical
matter capable of being managed by lawyers and legal scholars acting
together; but if there is no general consensus as to the nature and
function of law, the chances for such a unification by creation of a
modern ius commune by scholars and judges would seem to be slight.
For David's scheme to be capable of being effective, it must be
assumed that underlying all legal systems there are certain fundamental
concepts which are both discoverable and everywhere the same. This
seems doubtful 9 and the ideological differences already indicated would
render next to impossible the search for, and agreement on, such fun-
damental concepts which David assumes could constitute a modern ius
commune.
55 On this shift, see Arnaud, Essai d'Analyse Structurale du Code Civil Franqais (1973),
44-45, where Arnaud traces a move from natural law to positivism in the very
development from the Projet de l'an VIII to the 1804 Code civil des franais.
56 "Methods", pp. 24-25.
57 For a recent account of Savigny's work, see Stein, Legal Evolution. The Story of an Idea
(1980), 56-65.
58 Zajtay, "La Permanence du Droit Romain dans les Systhmes Juridiques Continentaux"
(1966) 18 Revue Internationale du Droit Comparg 353, 359.
59 Or, at least, the agreed concepts would be of so general and abstract a nature as hardly
to be promoting unification through the means of a new ius commune.
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The recent debate over the transplantability of laws has some rele-
vance here. 60 This debate has shown that much of law, within certain
limits, has little necessary connection with any particular country. If, for
the moment, one ignores the point made above about lack of consensus,
this conclusion might lead one to suppose that David was correct and that
the creation of a ius commune, as he proposes, would be possible. Para-
doxically, the opposite is the case. The debate in fact demonstrates that
factors other than those of a legal or technical nature operate to oppose
transplantation and, presumably, ultimate unification: consider, in this
respect, the opposition to unification of English and Scots contract law, 6'
or the fact that Louisiana is the only State of the Union not to have ratified
the Uniform Commercial Code. 62 What these two examples indicate is that
much more is at stake than the simple doctrinal management of rules
proposed by David would suggest. As Francis Bacon remarked-
. . . we see . . . that patrius mos is dear to all men, and that men are bred and
nourished up in the love of it; and therefore how harsh changes and innovations
are.
63
Unification or harmonisation of certain areas of law, particularly
commercial law, would seem desirable; but it is doubtful if this could be
achieved by scholars and judges. I have focused here on scholarly crea-
tion of a new ius commune because the problems relating to such have
been brought into high relief by Professor David's recent book. The
requisite political will and political action, and the use of international
conventions and model laws to create unity raise different problems
outwith the scope of this paper. 64
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60 See Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law (1974). See also
Watson, "Legal Transplants and Law Reform" (1976) 92 L.Q.R. 79 and"Compara-
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